Home | Writing | Talks and Similar | Knowledge Visualisations
Forthcoming. Free Will and Cognitive Biases. In Vainio, O-P. & Visala, A. Free Will and Theology (Routledge).
Forthcoming. Science, Determinism, and Free Will. In Harris, M. God and the Book of Nature: Experiments in Theology of Science (TBC).
Forthcoming. Evaluating the Value of Free Will: Comments on Ekstrom's God, Suffering and the Value of Free Will. Faith and Philosophy.
Forthcoming. Grace and Free Will: On Quiescence and Avoiding Semi-Pelagianism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
2022. On General and Non-General Abilities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. OnlineFirst. (journal)
2022. Does the automaticity in human behaviour undermine human moral responsibility? Theological Puzzles 8. (journal; video abstract)
2022. How (not) to think about the sense of 'able' relevant to free will. Inquiry 65(10): 1289-1307. (journal; postprint).
2022. Against Synchronic Free Will. In Kittle, S. and Gasser, G. The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives, 176-194. (New York: Routledge). (preprint)
2022. An Introduction to Thinking about Personal and A-Personal Aspects of the Divine. In Kittle, S. and Gasser, G. The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives, 1-20. (with Georg Gasser) (New York: Routledge). (preprint)
2022. The Incompatibility of Universal, Determinate Divine Causation with Human Free Will. In Vicens, L. and Furlong, P. Theological Determinism: New Perspectives, 100-118. (Cambridge University Press).
2022. God is (probably) a cause among causes. Theology and Science 22(2): 247-262. (journal; shortDOI: 10/hr3g)
2020. Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices. Religious Studies 56(4): 455-472. (journal; postprint)
2019. God and Human Freedom. Cambridge University Press. (with Leigh Vicens) (CUP page)
Peter Furlong has reviewed the book in Faith and Philosophy 37(3): 390-394. (journal)
2019. Does everyone think the ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will & moral responsibility? Philosophia 47(4): 1177–1183. (journal; postprint)
2019. When is an alternative possibility robust? European Journal of Philosophy 27(1): 199-210. (journal)
2018. Some problems of heavenly freedom. TheoLogica 2 (2): 97-115. (journal w/pdf)
2017. Robustness and up-to-us-ness. Disputatio 9 (44): 35-57. (journal w/pdf)
2016. Possibilities for divine freedom. Roczniki Filozoficzne 64 (4): 93-122. (journal w/pdf)
2015. Abilities to do otherwise. Philosophical Studies 172 (11): 3017-3035. (journal; postprint).
2015. Powers opposed and intrinsic finks. The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260): 372-380. (journal; postprint).
2015. Grace and free will: quiescence and control. Journal of Analytic Theology 3: 89-108. (journal w/pdf)
2014. Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘pre-decisional’ intervention. Philosophia 42 (4): 987-997. (journal; postprint).
2020. Review of W. Matthews Grant’s Free Will and God's Universal Causality. Faith and Philosophy 37(3): 374-379. (journal w/pdf)
2016. Review of John Martin Fischer’s Deep Control. Faith and Philosophy 33 (2): 235-239. (journal w/pdf)
2013. Review of Huoranszki’s Freedom of the Will. Disputatio V (37): 368-374. (journal w/pdf)
I also have a list of non-academic articles and a list of works in progress.